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Abstract—Infrastructure systems (e.g. water, electricity, 
transport networks) are the main facilitator of a countries social, 
economic and environmental wellbeing, by providing access to 
healthcare, education and communications, to name but a few 
examples.  However, in many worldwide communities these 
systems are currently being subjected to a multitude of 
challenges – from a changing climate, to increasing population 
demands and economic austerity.  The individual components of 
infrastructure systems (e.g. roads, bridges, reservoirs) are 
constructed to have long asset lives and existing components were 
therefore not designed to cope with these ever increasing external 
pressures.  As a consequence, the ability of our infrastructure 
systems to provide at least a baseline level of service after a 
severe weather event is being compromised.  In many cases, 
particularly in the UK, current solutions to increase the resilience 
of infrastructure systems are based on an ad hoc procedure.  This 
is mainly due to the current high levels of uncertainty regarding 
long-term climate projections, meaning that they cannot be 
reliably used as a basis for changing the design of future assets 
(e.g. through alteration of design codes), or to inform decisions to 
permanently alter current assets (e.g. through the construction of 
permanent flood defences).  Within this current “period of flux” 
we cannot simply do nothing, nor can we base decisions upon 
such uncertain models, we therefore require alternate more 
“adaptive” solutions to increase the resilience of our 
infrastructure.   
This paper will consider the development of a new generation 
of analysis and decision making tools, utilising deployable 
resources (e.g. mobile flood defences, grit storage) to increase the 
resilience of infrastructure systems when subjected to severe 
weather events.  Using this solution, a baseline level of service to 
our communities can be ensured, either through the protection of 
individual assets or the provision of a temporary service, without 
the need of long-term climate scenarios to inform decisions.  To 
ensure that this solution is effective, the main concern is the 
location of the deployable resource and also the timescale for 
deployment.  This paper proposes, and tests, a decision making 
“tool”, which can be used to identify the most suitable location(s) 
for storing resources, so that they can be deployed, when and 
where they are needed, with minimised average and maximum 
travel times.   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters are consequences of nature and can lead to 
loss of life and significant damage to local, and global, 
economies and infrastructure [1].  They can take various forms, 
including: metrological events such as floods, hurricanes, 
droughts or geological activities such as earthquakes and 
volcanoes.  These events are well renowned for their 
devastating impacts on civilisation and possess significant 
restraints on future development [2].  The initial impact of a 
natural disaster can be prolonged and amplified by disturbances 
to critical infrastructure systems, such as: electrical networks, 
water systems and transportation systems.  Failures in critical 
infrastructure systems often intensify the natural catastrophe 
and can lead to a significantly increased death toll [3]. 
It is often the failure to understand these complex, 
interacting infrastructure systems, to which our modern 
communities rely for “normal” everyday service, which lead to 
disproportionate impacts when they are disrupted by hazard 
[4].  For example, in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina two 
dozen hospitals were left without electricity, meaning that they 
could not operate laboratory and x-ray equipment, dialysis 
machines and ventilators, resulting in many potentially 
preventable deaths [5].  The effects of a natural disaster can 
also be felt economically and this economic disruption can 
linger for a significant period of time after the event.  For 
example, the estimated damage of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake 
and tsunami (Japan) is around $185-$309 billion [6] and has 
been estimated at five, or more, years to rebuild [7].  This 
estimated cost does not include the effects of power outages, 
caused by the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima power plant, or 
the subsequent loss of revenue to businesses.   
In our current uncertain climate, many natural hazard events 
have been predicted to either increase in frequency (impacting 
our communities more often) or in intensity (creating larger 
impacts).  It is therefore, becoming increasingly important that 
we understand the role that critical infrastructure plays with 
regards to society, that we are able to understand the 
implications for infrastructure failures and that we develop 
methods to form effective disaster management plans in order 
to mitigate against these failures.  In order to be effective, these 
disaster management plans need to be in place prior to a natural 
hazard event, meaning that information regarding potential 
infrastructure failures needs to be simulated data, rather than 
observed data.  There currently exist a number of 
methodologies in order to obtain this information, some of 
which have associated probabilities, giving a level of certainty 
to any predictions.  The discussion of these methodologies is 
outside the scope of this paper; however, the reader is directed 
to studies using: network graph techniques [8, 9], catastrophe 
risk modelling techniques [10, 11] and traditional physically 
based modelling approaches [12], for further information.  
Coupling this uncertainty in infrastructure system performance 
after a disaster event, with the increasing complexity of our 
cities, increasing urbanisation and a changing climate, creates a 
very complex problem.  
However, what is almost certain is that after a major natural 
disaster event there will be damage to critical infrastructure 
systems and consequently a loss of service.  In the immediate 
post-disaster period backup systems are often used to 
compensate for service loss (e.g. electricity generators or water 
trucks).  The locations for these services need to be carefully 
considered, in order to minimise the travel time from where 
they are stored to where they are needed, so they can be 
accessed and mobilised quickly when needed.   
In this paper, we develop a method to effectively locate 
resources prior to a natural hazard event, in order to minimise 
the distance to where they are needed in the immediate post 
disaster period.  We incorporate a “risk” element into our 
analysis, allowing sites/assets that either have a higher risk, or 
high consequence of failure, to “pull” the location of resource 
closer (allowing for a reduced distance).  We also conduct a 
sensitivity analysis of our presented methodology.   
II. DISASTER MANAGEMENT CYCLE 
Disaster management can be considered to be “the 
organisation and management of resources and 
responsibilities for dealing with all humanitarian aspects of 
emergencies” [13].  The risk of natural disasters will always 
be present in society and therefore infrastructure owners and 
operators, local and regional governments need to be prepared 
to handle emergency situations that may arise.  This requires 
the coordination of emergency plans of various organisations.  
Warfield [14] outlines the three aims of disaster management 
to be to: (i) reduce, or avoid, losses from hazards, (ii) assure 
prompt assistance to victims, and (iii) achieve rapid and 
effective recovery.  These aims broadly detail the components 
of the disaster management cycle, providing effective targets 
in minimising damages to communities in the event of a 
disaster. 
The disaster management cycle, demonstrated in Fig. 1, 
commonly consists of four phases [15, 16].  These are often 
split into two categories: pre-disaster (mitigation and 
preparedness) and post-disaster (response and recovery), 
although mitigation can also fall into the latter.  It is a 
continuous process by which lessons are learnt from each 
individual disaster and measures are then applied to alleviate 
adverse effect reoccurring, as a result of future disasters.  In 
this paper, we are focusing on methods to assist in the 
preparedness phase of the disaster management cycle, in order 
to be implemented during the response and immediate recovery 
phases.   
Fig. 1.  Showing the four phases of the disaster management cycle, adapted 
from [17].   
III. POTENTIAL IMPACT OF CORRECTLY LOCATING RESOURCES 
The identification of probable resource requirements, and 
their most effective storage location, is a key factor in 
managing potentially catastrophic situations, as well as 
protecting critical infrastructure whilst reducing fatalities [18].  
In many previous natural hazard events, planning where to 
locate vital resources could have significantly aided 
throughout the aftermath and recovery efforts.  It is worth 
noting that these emergency resources could be those that 
communities require in the pre-disaster period (e.g. flood 
defences) or in the immediate post-disaster period (e.g. 
shelters, healthcare).   
In the case of resources required in the pre-disaster period, 
even for natural hazards with limited warning times (e.g. 
tsunami or hurricane), the effective location of these resources 
could significantly reduce negative social and economic 
impacts.  However, it should be noted that it is not enough just 
to locate the resources effectively, there also needs to be a 
clear protocol in place for their use and deployment [19].    
Effectively locating resources within a supply chain can 
have a tremendous return in the event of a crisis.  Hale and 
Moberg [20] state a four-stage process to effectively locate 
emergency resources: 
1) Identify the resources needed at each location 
2) Identify the critical facilities within the supply chain 
3) Set a maximum response time for access to 
emergency resources and a minimum distance of a 
site storage area that must be placed away from the 
supply chain facilities. 
To date, only a limited amount of research has been 
conducted regarding the positioning of emergency resources 
and in order to ensure any disaster management protocol can 
be deployed, the positioning and response time is critical.  
Mitigation
PreparednessResponse
Recovery
Hence, emergency logistical planning can be established if 
policy makers can visualise and map how responsive their 
resources are, in turn, creating a situation where with enough 
warning time infrastructure can be protected and then utilised 
to reduce the impacts of the aftermath [21]. 
IV. EMERGENCY RESOURCE LOCATION METHOD 
In this paper, we develop a methodology for resource 
placement based upon the “weighted geographic centre” 
theory.  The geographic centre of a set of coordinates, points, 
locations can be found by averaging their x-coordinate and y-
coordinates.  Whereas, the weighted geographic centre is an 
adjusted geographic centre based on the attribute associated 
with each point (see Fig. 2).  This weighting could represent 
the ‘importance’ of a location to a user group (e.g. size of 
asset, greater quality of product) or could represent the 
probability of failure for each asset, for example.  The 
weighting essentially allows point with a higher weighting 
have more "pull" on the weighted centre moving it closer 
towards that point.  For a detailed overview of this method, the 
reader is directed to [4].  Whilst this may seem like a fairly 
straightforward calculation, there are a number of factors that 
need to be taken into account in this ‘weighting’ and also an 
appreciation of how this value impacts on the location of the 
weighted geographic centre.  For example, in the case of a 
hazard risk to these points, is this weighting made directly 
proportional to the risk or is there a magnification factor that 
should be considered.   
 
 
Fig. 2.  Showing a series of points (black dots) where the size of the point 
indicates their “importance” (larger points being more important).  The 
geographic centre is shown as a blue triangle, and the weighted geographic 
centre as a green triangle.   
V. CASE STUDY: UK FLOOD HAZARD 
Flooding is perhaps the most disruptive and most likely 
natural hazard to impact the UK.  The floods in the summer of 
2007 showed the geographically widespread nature of many 
natural hazards, with surface water flooding affecting many 
towns, villages and individual properties from Bristol to 
Newcastle.  This event also caused damage to a number of 
infrastructure systems, including the closure of electricity 
substations (including the closure of the Castle Meads 
substation which left 42,000 people without power for up to 
24 hours, [22]) and water treatment works (including the 
closure of the Mythe water treatment works causing 350,000 
people to be without access to mains water supply for 17 days 
[23]) due to flooding.  It was estimated that the insurance 
industry expected to pay out over £3 billion and economic 
losses to infrastructure systems was estimated at £674 million, 
with the water sector the worst affected [24].  After this flood 
event a detailed report was commissioned, the Pitt Review 
[25], which called for ‘a more systematic approach to building 
resilience in critical infrastructure’ [26] and highlighted the 
need for:  
 Improved understanding of the level of vulnerability 
to risk to which infrastructure and hence wider 
society is exposed; 
 More consistent emergency planning for failures; 
 Improved sharing of information at a local level for 
emergency response planning. 
Other recent notable flood events in the UK include the 
flooding in Cumbria in November 2009 (which notably ‘cut in 
half’ [27] communities through severe damage to bridges and 
also caused disruption to energy and water infrastructure [28]) 
and the summer 2012 floods (which included a flash flood 
event in Newcastle, where a month's rainfall fell in two hours, 
causing major disruption to transport infrastructure).  In a 
recent report, the Environment Agency highlighted that there 
were ‘significant risks to important national infrastructure’ 
[29] as a result of flooding; with over 55% of water and 
sewage pumping station/treatment works, 20% of railways, 
10% of major roads, 14% of electricity and 28% of gas 
infrastructure located in areas at risk from flooding. 
 In this paper we use a flooding event as the cause of 
disruption and to determine the infrastructure either in need of 
protection (in the pre-disaster period) or access to resources in 
the immediate post-disaster period.  To calculate the extent of 
the hazard for a case study area, we first obtained flood maps 
from the Environment Agency and coupled these with a 
district map of the UK, calculating the flood risk in each 
district (Fig. 3).  It is worth noting that we consider any 
severity of flood hazard in this analysis, from high to very-
low, we want to capture the total extent of flooding rather than 
considering the likelihood in this case.   
VI. CASE STUDY: RESOURCE PLACEMENT 
After assessing the extent of flood hazard in the UK, we 
now focus on one area as a case study for which to apply the 
methodology.  In this example, the aim is to assess the 
sensitivity of the weighted geographic mid-point tool to the 
risk associated with a number of asset sites.   
To achieve this, we have chosen a small area of the UK 
(approx. 100km square) to form our case study (Fig. 4).  
Within this area, we have identified the location of schools 
(2,166) and medical care facilities (410), which will act as the 
assets requiring a quantity of resource.  It is worth noting, that 
we assume all assets require the same quantify of resource.  
We have also calculated the extent of the flood hazard in the 
area, and used this to determine the number of assets at risk of 
flooding.  We carry out three analysis, the first calculating an 
unweighted geographic centre, the second assigning those 
assets at risk of current flood predictions a higher “weighting”, 
and the final analysis considering those assets within a 1,500m 
distance of the current flood hazard to have the higher 
“weighting” (to assess how a changing climate may impact the 
results achieved).   
 
 
Fig. 3.  Showing total area covered by a flood hazard for UK districts 
The initial calculations for unweighted geographic centre, 
for both schools and medical care facilities, are shown in Fig. 
4 and Fig. 5.  It can be seen that the geographic centres for 
both case studies are very close to the centre of the case study 
region, due to the spreading of assets over the location.   
 
Fig. 4.  Showing the location of assets (schools) in a case study area within the 
UK (orange dots).  The geographic centre is indicated by the green triangle.  
The topography of the area is also shown, as is the extent of the flood risk 
(blue areas).   
 
Fig. 5.  Showing the location of assets (medical care facilities) in a case study 
area within the UK (white dots).  The geographic centre is indicated by the 
green triangle.  The topography of the area is also shown, as is the extent of 
the flood risk (blue areas).   
We then identify those assets (both school and medical 
care) at current flood risk, which are highlighted in Fig 6 and 
Fig 7.  There are 129 schools at current flood risk (approx. 6% 
of all schools) and 29 hospitals at current flood risk (approx. 
7% of all medical care facilities).  We assign different 
“weighting” values to the sites at flooding risk and assess how 
the location of the geographic centre “moves” with this 
analysis.  These increased weightings allow the flood risk sites 
to “pull” the geographic centre, and therefore location of 
resource, closer to themselves.  We undertake the analysis to 
assess how the location and “strength of pull” that each flood 
risk site has impacts the location of the resources.  The results 
of this analysis are shown in Fig 6 and Fig 7.   
From these results, it can be seen that the location of the 
weighted geographic centre for schools moves in a south-
easterly direction as the “weighting” assigned to schools at 
risk of flooding increases.  Whereas, the weighted geographic 
centre location for the medical care facilities assets moves in 
an easterly direction.  Both of these are due to the location of 
the assets at flood risk.   
Fig 8 and Fig 9 plot the weighing assigned to assets at flood 
risk, against the change in distance from the unweighted 
geographic centre to the resulting weighted geographic centre.  
The results in both of these figures are fitted with a 
logarithmic trend line, meaning that for small increases in the 
weighting assigned to risk assets there is a significant change 
in the location of the geographic centre (and therefore the 
location of resources).  However, as this weighting is 
increased the impact to the location of the weighted 
geographic centre becomes less, eventually reaching a near 
static point.   
 Fig. 6.  Showing the location of assets (schools) in a case study area within the 
UK not at current flood risk (orange dots) and at risk of flooding (red dots).  
The geographic centre is indicated by the green triangle and the weighted 
geographic centres are indicated by the coloured dots.  The extent of the flood 
risk is also shown (blue areas).   
 
Fig. 7.  Showing the location of assets (medical care facilities) in a case study 
area within the UK not at current flood risk (white dots) and at risk of 
flooding (red dots).  The geographic centre is indicated by the green triangle 
and the weighted geographic centres are indicated by the coloured dots.  The 
extent of the flood risk is also shown (blue areas).   
 
 
Fig. 8.  Plotting the weighting assigned to school assets at risk of flooding and 
the resultant change in the distance of the weighted geographic centre from 
the unweighted geographic centre. 
 
Fig. 9.  Plotting the weighting assigned to medical care assets at risk of 
flooding and the resultant change in the distance of the weighted geographic 
centre from the unweighted geographic centre. 
Finally, we assess how a potential increase in flood risk for 
the case study area will impact on the location of the weighted 
geographic centre, and therefore storage location of resources.  
To achieve this, we calculate the number of assets (schools 
and medical care) that are within 1,500m of the current flood 
risk boundary, as shown in Fig 8 and Fig 9.  In this analysis, 
there are 2028 schools now at risk (approx. 94%) and 387 
medical care facilities now at risk (approx. 94%).  The results 
of this analysis are summarised in Table 3 and Table 4.  It is 
worth noting that the value of 1,500m is arbitrary and not an 
indication of how climate changes may alter the flood risk 
within the case study area. 
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Fig. 8.  Showing the location of assets (schools) in a case study area within the 
UK not at current flood risk (orange dots) and those within 1500m of current 
flood risk (red dots).  The geographic centre is indicated by the green triangle 
and the weighted geographic centres are indicated by the coloured dots.  The 
extent of the flood risk is also shown (blue areas).   
 
Fig. 9.  Showing the location of assets (medical care facilities) in a case study 
area within the UK not at current flood risk (white dots) and those within 
1500m of current flood risk (red dots).  The geographic centre is indicated by 
the green triangle and the weighted geographic centres are indicated by the 
coloured dots.  The extent of the flood risk is also shown (blue areas).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Detailing the change in distance from the unweighted geographic 
mid-point when the schools within 1,500m of current flood risk are assigned a 
higher weighting.   
Weighting Distance from unweighted geographic mid-point 
2 391 meters 
5 639 meters 
1000 808 meters 
 
Table 4.  Detailing the change in distance from the unweighted geographic 
mid-point when the medical care facilities within 1,500m of current flood risk 
are assigned a higher weighting.   
Weighting Distance from unweighted geographic mid-point 
2 285  meters 
5 464 meters 
1000 586 meters 
 
For both of these case study examples, it can be seen that 
the location of the weighted geographic centre does not alter 
by a large amount in relation to the location of the unweighted 
geographic centre.  This is due largely to the large number of 
assets at flood risk in the case study, and also the distributed 
locations of these assets.   
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have assessed the sensitivity of a weighted 
geographic centre tool to assets with differing associated risks.  
We applied our analysis to school and medical care assets in 
one case study location, assigning increasing weighting values 
to assets at flood risk.  Through this analysis, it was found that 
there is a logarithmic relationship between the weighting 
assigned to assets and the change in location (in terms of 
distance) from the weighted geographic centre to the 
unweighted geographic centre.  This suggests that just a small 
increased weighting value assigned to assets at risk of hazard 
will have a potentially large impact on the location of the 
weighted geographic centre and therefore the location of 
resources. 
In this paper we have chosen to apply our analysis to that of 
medical care facilities and schools subjected to flood hazard.  
However, we could equally have chosen another form of 
hazard and an appropriate hazard model to determine the 
infrastructre assets most at risk.  For example, in the case of 
wind storm hazard the assets closest to the center of the storm 
would be assigned the higher weighting (allowing them a 
greater "pull" on the weighted geographic centre and therefore 
moving the required resource closer to these points).  
We have focused primarily on the distance from each asset 
location to the stored resource location (which is determined 
in the analysis).  However, future studies should also consider 
the time taken for the stored resource to reach the asset 
location.  This could be achieved by coupling the analysis to a 
road network dataset and running an optimisation algorithm.  
Thereby, optimising the location of the resource (in a location 
close to the road network) so as to minimise the travel time, 
rather than distance, to each asset location.  Through this 
analysis it may be that two, or more, sites result from the 
algorithm, due to the configuration of the road network (e.g. 
one route might be shorter, but use roads with a lower speed 
limit and a second route may be longer but use roads with a 
high speed limit).   
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